Managing price risk with futures contracts creates liquidity risk through marking to market. Liquidity risk matters in an imperfect capital market where interim losses on a futures position have to be nanced at a borrowing rate that is higher than the risk-free rate. However, the impact of liquidity risk can be mitigated using options on futures. This paper analyzes the optimal risk management and production decisions of a risk-averse rm that faces joint price and liquidity risk and can trade derivatives in unbiased markets. Its main contribution is to provide a rationale for the use of futures and options on futures in imperfect capital markets for risk management purposes. The analytical results show that there is a hedging role for option on futures: If liquidity risk materializes, the rm sells options on futures in order to partly cover this liquidity need. The additional exposure to price risk created by the options position is partly oset by an adjustment of the futures position. Otherwise, no options are traded and the optimal futures position is a full hedge. Numerical results show that the existence of liquidity risk reduces the optimal futures hedge ratio and that options are not normally used before a liquidity need actually arises. The paper also provides comparative statics results.
Introduction
Consider a producer exposed to output price risk. If price risk can be managed with futures contracts, a full hedge ensures that the producer's nancial position at the hedging horizon is almost risk-free. However, this is only true if the producing rm can always accommodate the liquidity needs that may arise from the marking to market of the futures position. Depending on the development of the futures price over time, marking to market may lead to interim cash inows and/or cash outows prior to the hedging horizon. Suppose that the producing rm faces a liquidity constraint in the sense that there is no free cash at hand. If the original futures position generates an interim loss, the producer will have to raise additional cash in order to maintain the position. Usually, the borrowing rate is higher than the interest rate applicable to any excess cash that might be generated by marking to market. Hence, the producer faces liquidity risk: If the futures position creates an intermediate loss, additional cash has to be raised which is costly. The producer will anticipate the possibility of additional liquidity needs arising from the futures position when deciding about the optimal hedging position in futures contracts. If the producer can also trade options on futures, he might use these options to manage the liquidity risk borne by the futures position. This will also aect the size of the optimal futures position and the optimal production decision. This paper analyzes the impact of joint price risk and liquidity risk on optimal output and on the optimal positions in futures and in options on futures taken by a risk-averse producing rm. Hedging price risk with futures contracts creates liquidity risk through marking to market. Liquidity risks can be signicant 1 : In the extreme case, the entire derivatives position has to be liquidated. In less extreme cases, there is the opportunity cost of quickly raised cash. The rm modeled here 1 See Committee on Payments and Settlement Systems (1998) .
faces a liquidity constraint in the following sense: There is no free cash available from within the rm, but the rm can borrow additional funds at a rm-specic borrowing rate. In addition, the rm can trade options on futures. As the liquidity risk is an asymmetric risk it only materializes if the futures position creates an interim cash outow options might be used to alleviate the impact of liquidity risk on the rm's nancial position.
The paper employs a two-period framework where futures contracts maturing at the end of the second period are traded at the beginning of each period. In addition, one-period options on futures are traded at the beginning of every period.
The analytical results are as follows: If the derivatives position entered into in the rst period generates a loss by the end of this period, the rm will optimally sell fairly priced call options on futures in order to generate funds to cover (part of) this loss. 2 As doing so changes the rm's exposure to price risk, the futures position is adjusted as well. If there is no loss by the end of the rst period, no options position will be taken and the rm fully hedges with futures contracts over the second period.
The numerical results show that the rm under-hedges in the rst period as a result of the existence of the liquidity constraint. They also indicate that options are not used in the rst period.
The impact of liquidity risk on futures hedging has been studied by Lien (2003) , Lien and Li (2003) Wong (2004a) , Wong (2004b) and Wong and Xu (2006) . Lien (2003) shows that the initial futures position depends upon the rm's ability to cope with losses arising from marking to market. Wong (2004a) proves that the optimal futures hedge is an underhedge if the rm is prudent in the sense of Kimball (1990; 1993) . He also shows that production decreases if liquidity risk is introduced. Wong (2004b) analyzes the hedging problem of a rm that can trade futures contracts with two dierent maturities. All these papers focus on a particular type of liquidity risk where the rm has to liquidate the entire futures position if the interim cash outow exceeds an exogenously given threshold. 3 This assumption is isomorphic to assuming that the cost of covering an interim loss caused by marking to market equals the risk-free rate for an amount up to the level of the threshold and then eectively jumps to innity such that raising external cash beyond the threshold is ruled out. In contrast, our model follows Korn (2004) by assuming that there is no such borrowing threshold but that all borrowing has to be done at a rm-specic borrowing rate depending on the rm's credit standing. It seems more appropriate for most rms to assume that there is no such extreme jump in the cost of raising additional cash. As a consequence, the rm is able to maintain its futures position even if the interim losses are signicant.
The two papers that are closest to ours are Korn (2004) and Wong and Xu (2006) . Korn (2004) analyzes optimal forward hedging. His model is based on the assumption that the rm will have to provide cash as collateral if the forward position has a negative market value prior to the hedging horizon. Unlike our model, an interim cash inow from the forward position is not permitted in Korn's (2004) model. More importantly, Korn (2004) does not allow for options whereas our model does. To our knowledge, Wong and Xu's (2006) model is the rst to incorporate options (on the rm's output) into the futures hedging problem. In their model, however, the rm has to liquidate any derivatives position if the interim loss exceeds an exogenously given threshold. Our model, in contrast, uses a more exible approach by assuming a rm-specic borrowing rate that allows the rm to borrow larger amounts, though always at a cost. In sum, the present paper's contribution is to combine the joint availability of options and futures contracts with the more exible, less extreme ap-proach to model liquidity risk that does not require an exogenously xed borrowing threshold.
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents the model. As a benchmark for comparison, Section 3 characterizes the optimal decisions in the absence of liquidity risk. The main results of the paper are presented in Sections 4 and 5: The optimal decisions taken in the second period are characterized analytically in Section 4. Numerical results including the decisions taken in the rst period are presented in Section 5. Section 6 concludes. All proofs are relegated to the Appendix.
The model
The rm under consideration produces a commodity that is sold at a random spot price at a later date. Commodity price risk introduces uncertainty into the rm's cash ows. However, price risk can be managed with futures contracts and with options on these futures contracts. The rm's optimal hedging decisions are analyzed in a simple dynamic setting with three dates, t = 0, 1, 2. Futures contracts are traded at t = 0 and t = 1 and mature at t = 2. One-period call options on futures are traded at t = 0 and t = 1. Positions in futures and options on futures will generally lead to cash ows at all three dates.
The rm is assumed to operate under a liquidity constraint: There is no free cash available in the rm. As a result, any net cash outow forces the rm to borrow at an interest rate above the risk-free rate. 4 The markup over the risk-free rate is denoted by τ ≥ 0. τ is time-invariant and independent of the value of the rm's position in the underlying commodity and its derivatives positions. Cash inows at t = 0 and t = 1 will be invested until the next date at the risk-free rate. For simplicity, the risk-free rate is set equal to zero.
In the following, we describe the rm's decisions and the resulting cash ows in detail. At t = 0, three decisions have to be made. The rst is on the amount to be
Costs C(Q) are accrued to t = 2. At t = 2, the rm's output is sold in a competitive market at a priceS that is risky. 5S is distributed over support [S, S] .
Producing an amount Q and selling it at t = 2 leads to a cash ow ofSQ − C(Q) at that date. Other activities of the rm are assumed to generate a deterministic cash
The second decision is on the size of futures position. This position is denoted by X 0 where X 0 > 0 indicates a forward sale and X 0 < 0 a forward purchase. Futures contracts mature at t = 2 and are marked to market at t = 1. given the information at time t. 6 Marking to market at t = 1 generates a cash ow
7 At t = 2, the futures position expires and leads to a cash ow of
The third decision to be made at t = 0 relates to the position in call options on futures, denoted Z 0 . 8 At t = 0, there are call options available with maturity t = 1 and strike price K 0 at a premium of P 0 . Suppose that The second decision to be made at t = 1 is on the size of the position in call options maturing at t = 2. The premium of these options is P 1 , their strike price is
The unbiasedness of the futures market in the second period implies
10 Z 1 > 0 denotes a long position in call options, Z 1 < 0 a short position. Taking an options position at t = 1 generates an immediate cash ow of −Z 1 P 1 and a cash ow of
In order to focus on the hedging role of options and futures contracts, the markets for these derivatives are assumed to be jointly unbiased. 11 Hence, option prices are
and futures prices are given by
10 Due to convergence property of futures prices, it does not matter whether the options under consideration here are options on futures contracts maturing at t = 2 or options on the underlying itself. For any such options to make economic sense, we have to have S < f 1 < S.
11 Benninga and Oosterhof (2004) show that the representative agent does not necessarily have to be risk neutral in order to ensure that the futures market is unbiased.
for t = 0, 1. In addition, it is assumed that the futures market is intertemporally unbiased such that f 0 = E 0 [S]. In biased markets, there will be speculative positions in options and/or futures contracts which could be easily incorporated into the model. However, the purpose of this paper is not to impose an ad hoc pricing theory but to concentrate on the hedging role of futures and options.
The remainder of this section focuses on the cash ows resulting from these decisions. As the rm faces a liquidity constraint, negative cash ows at t = 0 and t = 1 will have to be nanced until the following date. At t = 0, the total cash ow amounts to φ 0 = −P 0 Z 0 . If φ 0 is positive, the rm will invest the excess cash at the risk-free rate until t = 1, generating a cash inow of φ 0 at t = 1. However, if φ 0 is negative, the liquidity constraint is binding such that the rm will have to borrow at the markup τ and repay (1 + τ ) φ 0 at t = 1. 
Any excess cash (φ 1 > 0) will be invested until t = 2. If φ 1 < 0, the rm is liquidity constrained at t = 1 in which case it has to borrow until t = 2 and repay
At t = 2, there are cash ows from producing and selling the output, from the rm's other activities, from the settlement of the options position Z 1 and the futures positions X 0 and X 1 as well as from φ 1 . They add up tõ
Substituting φ 0 and φ 1 into φ 2 results in the rm's total cash ow at date t = 2,
given the information at t = 0, denoted W (S,f 1 ,P 1 ):
The decision maker is assumed to have preferences over the distribution ofW that can be summarized by a utility function U (W ) that is at least twice continuously dierentiable and exhibits risk aversion,
Futures contracts are often written on underlyings where the production process is subject to quantity risk, for example in agriculture. As quantity risk is not the focus of this paper it might seem more appropriate to model a processor's decision problem where quantity risk is usually very small. However, this paper models a producer in order to keep the analysis in line and therefore comparable with the literature.
3 Optimal decisions in the absence of liquidity risk This paper focuses on the impact of a liquidity constraint on optimal decisions.
In order to establish a benchmark for comparison, this section analyzes the rm's decisions in the absence of such a constraint. Hence, we assume that τ = 0 throughout this section. As follows directly from (3), the rm's cash ow at t = 2 in this benchmark case is given bỹ
In the absence of a liquidity constraint, any cash outow from marking to market can be met without incurring additional cost. Hence, marking to market has no impact at all (as the risk-free interest rate is zero) and Holthausen's (1979) results for the related single-period problem still apply in the multi-period setting of the current model: The rm fully hedges at t = 0 and production is determined independently of the (joint) distribution of the risk(s) faced and the degree of risk aversion of the decision maker (separation theorem). There is no role for options on futures, even in the multi-period setting. 13 The futures position is not adjusted at t = 1. This is summarized in the following statement.
Proposition 1 13 Battermann et al. (2000) derive a similar result for the single-period case. In a multi-period framework, Lapan et al. (1991) show that there is no hedging role for options, given a certain type of basis risk. Unlike the present paper, theirs focuses on options on the spot and does not allow for marking to market.
The impact of liquidity risk
We now assume that the rm is liquidity constrained such that any liquidity needs have to be covered by borrowing at a markup over the risk-free rate of τ . Excess cash is invested at the risk-free rate of zero. The rm's optimization problem has to be solved recursively. While the optimal decisions taken at t = 1 can be characterized without imposing any further assumptions, the decisions at t = 0 can not. Therefore, numerical solutions are presented in Section 5.
Consider the second-period problem where the decisions on Q, X 0 and Z 0 have already been made. At t = 1, the realizations of the random variablesf 1 andP 1 are known. Against this background, the rm solves
In order to simplify the notation, let
denote the rm's cash ow at t = 1, excluding the cash ow generated from any options position taken at that date.
If κ < 0, the rm's optimal decisions on X 0 and Z 0 , combined with the realization of the futures pricef 1 , generate a cash outow. Hence, the liquidity constraint is binding. As (1) shows, any other cash ow at t = 1 can only be generated by taking a position in options on futures. If no options position is taken, the rm has to borrow |κ| until t = 2. The rm can reduce the size of the loan by shortening options. Intuitively, we would expect options on futures to play a role whenever κ < 0.
Alternatively, if κ ≥ 0, the decisions taken at t = 0 and the realization off 1 do not create a cash outow. In other words, the liquidity constraint is not binding.
Intuition suggests that the rm's optimal decisions at t = 1 are the same as in the 
is not optimal given κ < 0. The rationale behind this result is based on a cost argument and a risk argument.
Consider the cost argument rst. As κ < 0, the rm has to borrow the amount |κ| which is costly. A short position in options on futures generates a cash inow of
This cash inow reduces the amount that is ultimately borrowed from t = 1 until t = 2 and therefore reduces the borrowing costs associated with the loss generated by the derivatives portfolio during the rst period. In sum, given the need to raise costly external funds, κ < 0, the rm is willing to take someS-risk in order to benet from a reduction in the amount to be borrowed.
The second part of Proposition 2 shows that options on futures are redundant for hedging purposes if and only if the rm does not realize any losses on its hedging position by the end of the rst period. In this case, the rm fully hedges over the second period using futures contracts only. 15 Its total cash ow at t = 2 simplies
14 Selling options on futures, combined with a long position in futures contracts, is (almost) identical to borrowing at the risk-free rate. See Hull (2006, Ch. 14) . Therefore, assuming that the rm can trade options at a price of P 1 allows the rm to indirectly borrow at the risk-free rate. This is not inconsistent with the assumption that the rm, if borrowing directly, has to pay a markup for two reasons: Ordinary lenders often times are less well-informed about a borrowers derivatives portfolio compared to exchanges that closely monitor each market participants position. This is in line with the fact that exchanges are able to classify market participants into hedgers and non-hedgers; hedgers have to provide (signicantly) lower initial margins. The second reason for why the rm can (eectively) trade at P 1 is that the exchange can use the futures position as a collateral for the rm's options position, guaranteeing that the rm will be able to deliver if the options are exercised.
15 This is in line with the result derived by Wong and Xu (2006) for another type of liquidity constraint.
Numerical results
The numerical results are based on the following assumptions: The futures price follows a multiplicative random walk withf t =θ t f t−1 where E t−1 [θ t ] = 1 and theθ t are i.i.d., t = 1, 2. In particular, we assume thatθ t follows a three-point distribution where θ t is either u, 1 or d, u > 1 > d > 0. 16 We also assume that f 0 = 1, u = 1.25, Other simulations clearly indicate a negative relation between the markup rate τ and optimal output Q * . This illustrates the well-known result that introducing an additional risk (here in the form of liquidity risk) decreases production if the additional risk cannot be perfectly hedged. 17 In order to save space, these simulations are not presented here.
Optimal hedging decisions
The rm's output is exogenously xed at Q = 100 such that all futures positions can be easily interpreted as percentage hedge ratios. The deterministic payment I is set equal to total production costs, C(Q) = I. Relative risk aversion is 2. Table I presents the optimal values for X 0 , X 1 , Z 0 and Z 1 for dierent levels of the markup 16 The assumption of a multiplicative random walk has no signicance for the results. We use a multiplicative random walk as this implies a constant volatility of the futures return. Chang and Wong (2003) and Lien and Li (2003) use an additive random walk over several periods. In a two-period framework similar to ours, Wong (2004a Wong ( , 2004b and Wong and Xu (2006) assume an additive relation over the second period .
17 See, for example, Broll et al. (1995) and Viaene and Zilcha (1998 The rst column shows by how much the borrowing rate exceeds the risk-free rate. The next two columns present the optimal hedging decisions made at t = 0.
The remaining columns show the optimal decisions taken at t = 1, conditional on whether the liquidity constraint is binding (in which case f 1 > f 0 and κ < 0) or not.
Consider the decisions taken at t = 1 rst. For f 1 > f 0 , the optimal derivatives position taken at t = 0 generates a cash outow such that κ < 0 (column 4); the liquidity constraint is binding. Columns 5 and 6 show that the rm sells options on futures, Z * 1 < 0, and reduces its futures position, X * 1 < 0. For f 1 ≤ f 0 , the optimal derivatives position taken at t = 0 generates a non-negative cash ow at t = 1,
19 The last two columns illustrate Proposition 2 as X * 0 + X * 1 = Q = 100 and Z * 1 = 0.
18 The credit spread for rms with investment grade ratings was well below 2% in the US (King and Khang, 2005; Yua, 2005; Campbell and Taksler, 2003; Duee, 1998) . However for rms with lower credit ratings, spreads were considerably higher. Using a sample of bonds issued by corporations from 15 dierent countries, Gabbi and Sironi (2002) indicates that bonds with a Standard & Poor's rating of B have an average spread of 5.95%, where bonds with CCC rating have an average spread of 9.05%. More recently, credit spreads have widened signicantly in the wake of the subprime crisis. 19 The values for κ given that f 1 ≤ f 0 are not shown in Table I .
To be more specic, focus on the case where τ = 5%. At t = 1, the cash ow of the rm depends on the realization of f 1 and any options position taken at this date.
Given Next, consider the decisions taken at t = 0. Table I shows that the rm optimally under-hedges with futures contracts at t = 0 if τ > 0. The optimal futures position, X * 0 , decreases in the markup rate. For example, a rm facing a markup of 5% above the risk-free rate only hedges 92.1% of its output at t = 0 with futures contracts.
The economic intuition behind this result is the following: On the one hand, risk aversion creates an incentive to reduce the exposure to price risk. At X 0 = Q, this price risk is completely hedged. On the other hand, any futures position taken at t = 0 exposes the rm to liquidity risk: If the futures price f 1 is such that the futures position generates a cash outow at t = 1, the rm will have to borrow. Borrowing is more costly the higher τ . Given f 1 > f 0 , the rm has to borrow more the higher the position in futures taken at t = 0. As Table I shows, the optimal futures position is a compromise between managing price risk and reducing the exposure to liquidity risk: As τ increases, liquidity risk becomes more pronounced such that the rm reduces its exposure to this risk by choosing a smaller optimal futures position.
Column 3 indicates that the rm does not take any position in options on futures at t = 0. This might seem surprising as the liquidity risk materializes in exactly those states in which options generate a cash inow. Consequently, one would have expected the rm to buy call options already at t = 0 as a means to generate additional cash at t = 1 in those states, i.e. to hedge against the liquidity risk using options. As τ increases, the borrowing costs incurred from t = 1 to t = 2 grow such that the incentive to buy options at t = 0 in order to create a cash inow at t = 1 increases as well. However, the rm is not only liquidity constrained at t = 1 but also liquidity constrained at t = 0. Any long options position taken at t = 0 will have to be nanced through borrowing at τ until at least t = 1. This can be interpreted as the cost of buying options at t = 0. Both the benet and the cost increase in τ . Our result indicates that the benets are exactly outweighed by the cost such that the net eect of an increase in τ on Z * 0 is zero. Consequently, no options position is taken at t = 0. Wong and Xu (2006) who show that, given their type of liquidity constraint, the rm should buy call options at t = 0. However, their model is based on the assumption that there is a liquidity constraint at t = 1 but no such constraint at t = 0. In other words, there are no (additional) costs of buying fairly priced options at t = 0 in their model but only benets. Hence, it is not surprising that options will be used at t = 0 in their framework.
This nding is not in line with

Comparative statics
This subsection focuses on the eects of changes in volatility and risk aversion.
Consider an increase in the volatility of the futures price: As proven in Proposition 1, in the absence of liquidity risk the rm optimally fully hedges with futures contracts irrespective of the distribution of the spot priceS; options are not used. However, when the rm is liquidity constrained, price volatility matters: Given that there is a cash outow at t = 1, its expected value increases in volatility. Taken in isolation, this makes futures hedging over the rst period less attractive. At the same time, higher volatility implies higher potential hedging benets over both periods, making futures hedging more attractive. Hence, the impact of price volatility on the optimal futures position is not clear a priori. Again, these eects are more pronounced for larger values of τ .
The impact of changes in risk aversion is briey illustrated in Table II , assuming a markup rate of 5%.
22 21 These results are in line with those derived by Korn (2004) for a dierent set of assumptions including the absence of options on futures. The fact that they are not in line with Deep's (2002) result is caused by the dierence in the modeling of the liquidity constraint.
22 Gollier (2001, Ch. 2) argues for levels of relative risk aversion between unity and four. Table   II has the same structure as Table I .) It shows that the optimal futures position taken at t = 0 increases moderately in risk aversion. This reects the fact that the hedging benets are valued more highly when the decision maker exhibits higher risk aversion. If the liquidity constraint is binding at t = 1, the rm reduces its short position in options on futures as risk aversion increases. It also reduces the number of futures contracts sold. Hence, a rm with higher risk aversion is willing to accept higher borrowing costs in order to reduce the additional exposure to price risk created by selling options. Table II indicates that the eect of an increase in risk aversion on X * 1 and, in particular, on Z * 1 can be signicant.
Conclusions
This paper analyzes the impact of liquidity risk on the optimal production and risk management decisions of a risk-averse rm that can manage price risk with futures contracts and options on these futures. Liquidity risk created by marking to market as well as the use of options might create cash ows prior to the hedging horizon.
Our results show that liquidity risk lowers the optimal futures hedge ratio in the rst period. It also reduces production. The optimal futures position is a compromise between two conicting objectives: The rst is to reduce the exposure to price risk, the second is to avoid the cost created by liquidity risk 
Due to the concavity of the problem, the solution is unique. Substituting the
As this is a deterministic amount, conditions (7) and (8) The rst period problem is given by 
Substituting (10) into the rst-order condition for Q b * , given by
and dividing by
denotes the inverse of the rm's marginal cost function, we have Q
(f 0 )) as a candidate solution.
Using the same logic as above, it is straightforward to show that the rm's prots at t = 0 are deterministic such that conditions (10) and (11) we will present and prove a lemma that will be used in part (d).
(a) Given f 1 , P 1 , Q * , X * 0 and Z * 0 , the rm solves the problem in (6). Due to the concavity of this problem, its solution is unique. As the derivatives markets are jointly unbiased, the rst-order condition for X * 1 is given by
Condition (13) 
using the unbiasedness of the derivatives markets. Unbiasedness also implies that 
It follows from Lemma 1 that the rst term in (19) is 
